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ABSTRACT 
Recognizing the fact that a player’s cognition plays a defining role in the resulting equilibrium of a game of competition, 
this paper provides the foundation for a Nash game with forward-looking players by presenting a formal definition of 
the Nash game with consideration of the players’ belief. We use a simple two-firm model to demonstrate its fundamen- 
tal difference from the standard Nash and Stackelberg games. Then we show that the players’ belief functions can be re- 
garded as the optimization parameters for directing the game towards a much more desirable equilibrium. 
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1. Introduction 
Game theory has been very well recognized as a branch 
of applied mathematical tools, best for analyzing the 
phenomenon of selfish competition, which arises in nu- 
merous real-life applications ranging from economics to 
social sciences, and even to engineering problems. Many 
optimization problems can be viewed as a competition 
problem. 
If there are shared resources, then inherently there will 
be competition in the allocation of such resources. An 
individual who participates in the resource allocation 
always wishes to maximize its payoff. Nevertheless, the 
player’s return not only depends on its own strategy, but 
is also dependent on competitors’ responses. As a result, 
ideally, a player should choose or optimize its strategy 
based on not only its immediate return but also the possi- 
ble outcomes of how others might respond to its strategy. 
Apparently, a player’s cognition (i.e., its belief on how 
the environment as a whole would react to any of its ac- 
tion) will be pivotal in the optimization of its strategy for 
maximizing its payoff and in defining the equilibrium of 
the game. 
In the literature, there are a number of game-theoretic 
models and they differ in their assumptions on the play- 
ers’ cognition. Due to this fundamental difference, these 
models represent different competition environments,  
thereby resulting in very different outcomes, which at the 
steady state are referred to as equilibria. When the com- 
petition process reaches an equilibrium, by definition, no 
player would have incentive to change their strategies 
further to deviate from the equilibrium which is therefore 
usually considered as a satisfactory outcome to all play- 
ers. 
The most popular model has to be the Nash game [1] 
in which a player has the belief that other players’ strate- 
gies are fixed and will not change regardless of what it 
does. A Nash game is based on such assumption on the 
players’ cognition. It is noted that the game is still very 
well defined, although the player’s belief is totally inac- 
curate. 
On the other hand, in a Stackelberg game [2], there is a 
super player, commonly known as leader, who knows all 
the information about its competitors, known as follow- 
ers. In this case, the leader is considered to have perfect 
cognition and therefore can obtain the most rewarding 
strategy. 
In most practical competition situations, the efficiency 
of a Nash game resulting in the most celebrated Nash 
equilibrium is often poor (which will be revealed by a 
two-firm example later in this paper). The main reason is 
that the assumption for the Nash game is too much sim- 
plified, and it fails to account for the interaction between 
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the players. In contrast, the assumption for the Stackel- 
berg model is too stringent and it is often too difficult to 
be qualified to be a leader in most practical scenarios. 
Nevertheless, the Stackelberg equilibrium is highly bene- 
ficial to the leader. The limitation is that if there were 
two or more leaders, all of which possess perfect cogni- 
tion and wish to be the biggest winner, this would lead to 
a tragedy [3]. 
In this paper, we recognize the importance of players’ 
cognition in a game, and focus on how the assumption of 
the players’ cognition affects the equilibrium. Based on 
the analysis of Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, we pro- 
vide a new definition for the Nash game with considera 
tion of the players’ belief. As a useful byproduct, the new 
definition facilitates the interpretation of the players’ 
belief as the optimization parameters, which, if optimized 
properly, can direct the game towards a Pareto-efficient 
equilibrium. 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. The Two-Firm Model 
For illustrative purpose, in this paper, we use a simple 
two-firm model in economics as an example. In this 
simple model, there are two firms, Firm A and Firm B. 
They manufacture an identical product and its unit cost is 
the same for both firms. In addition, the profit per unit 
product diminishes as the number of products available 
in the market increases. In particular, let  0ax   de- 
note the number of products manufactured by Firm A, 
and  be that manufactured by Firm B. The unit 
cost is denoted by  and the price per product which is 
set the same by both Firm A and Firm B is assumed to be 
a b  for some constant . Therefore, the 
profit functions for Firm A and Firm B are, respectively, 
given by 
 0bx 
x 

.
c
a x > 0a
   
   
, ,
,
a a b a b a
b a b a b b
f x x a x x c x
f x x a x x c x
        
       (1) 
In various game-theoretic models, the objective would 
be for Firm A and Firm B to iteratively optimize their 
respective strategies, ax  and bx , for maximizing their 
profits (1) in a competitive fashion. Before we examine 
different equilibria of this two-firm game, we find it 
useful to first present the general notations of a game. 
For a game with > 1K  players, we denote the stra- 
tegy profile for player  as  and use k k
1 2 K                    (2) 
to represent the strategy profile for all the players. 
Moreover, we use  to denote a spe- 
cific choice of strategy from all the players, where 
 is the strategy adopted by player , and 
 ,k kx x x 
 1 1 1, , , , ,k k k Kx x x x    x           (3) 
denotes the adopted strategy by all the players except 
player . Likewise, the reward function for player k  
is denoted by
k
  k . If the game converges to an 
equilibrium, then we will use the superscript  f x *  to 
highlight that the corresponding parameters are at the 
equilibrium. For instance, we have  and *x *kf  at the 
equilibrium. 
2.2. Nash Competition 
Given the competition of K players, if at some point, no 
one can gain any further by deviating from its present 
strategy, then the strategy of all the players is said to 
have reached to an equilibrium [4]. Mathematically, we 
have    *and  : , .k k k k k kk x f f x     x *x      (4) 
Now, proceed to derive the Nash equilibrium for the 
two-firm example. According to (4), Firm A solves 
   *
0 0
, .max max
a a
a a b a b a
x x
*f x x a x x c x
 
         (5) 
As such, it can be easily shown that 
*
* *d 2 .
d 2
a b
b a a
a
f a x c
a x c x x
x
             (6) 
Similarly, *bx  can be derived, resulting the set of 
simultaneous equations 
*
*
*
*
,
2
.
2
b
a
a
b
a x c
x
a x c
x
     
               (7) 
As a result, the game governed by (7) will reach the 
Nash equilibrium 
* ,
3 3
a c a c   x ,
              (8) 
which leads to the profits 
     2 2* * *, , .        (9) 9 9a b a c a cf f
       
f
It is worth pointing out here that in Nash equilibrium 
when taking 
d
d
a
a
f
x
 in the optimization for player A, 
player A believes that  at any given time instance is 
optimal and fixed, or 
bx
*d
0
d
b
a
x
x
 . This is obviously 
inaccurate. At the Nash equilibrium in particular, from 
kkx  k
(1.7), we actually have  *d 0.5 0
d
b
a
x
x
   . This shows 
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that a Nash player’s cognition and the reality have con-  
he profit functi
According to (10) and using (1
best strategy by siderable difference and t on  *,a a bf x x  
is in fact only the profit in the ideal situation b b
*x x  
but does not represent the actual profit function due to 
interaction from player B. 
2.3. Stackelberg Competition 
A player can benefit more from the rest of the players in 
cognition about how a game if this player has perfect 
others would react to its strategy. This is studied formally 
by the Stackelberg equilibrium. In the general setting 
with K  players, if player   is the leader, it should 
know perfectly the response function  x x  and 
therefore is able to obtain the most effective strategy 
such that 
    *: , .x f f x x         x x      (10) 
For other players , as they do not have any 
information about any of the other players’
they can  that ot
k 
 strategies, 
only assume her players’ strategies are 
fixed, and will act like a Nash player, see (4). As a result, 
we have 
   * *  and  : , .k k k k k kk x f f x      x x    (11) 
In a Stackelberg game, there is a very strict order of 
how the players play the game [1,5]. In particular, leader 
  needs to first give out its strategy and lets other 
players compete to reach a Nash equilibrium against this 
strategy before it revises its strategy for another round of 
competition among the rest of the players. Achieving the 
Stackelberg equilibrium will thus require a two-level 
game. 
The merit of Stackelberg equilibrium is that leader   
has an absolute advantage over other players but the 
drawback is that knowing the function  x x  wou  
be too difficult to achieve in practice, if not impossible. 
A standard approach would require the le  to try 
exhaustively all possible x 
ld
ader
  to identify the best 
strategy. 
Recalling from the two-firm example, if we let Firm A 
be the leader and Firm B be llower, then according 
to (11
 the fo
), player B’s cognition is that player A’s strategy is 
optimal and fixed and player B therefore aims to solve 
   * *
0 0
, ,max max
b b
b b a a b b
x x
f x x a x x c x
 
        (12) 
which by setting 
d
0
d
b
b
f
x
  gives 
,
2
ax c 
b
a
x                (13) 
which is the exact response function of player B with 
respect to any action ax . 
3), player A finds its 
 
0 0
.max max
a a
a
a a
x x
a x c
2a a
f x a x c x
 
         (14)   
As a result, the best strategy for player A can be ana- 
lytically obtained as 
*
2a
a cx                 (15) 
and the corresponding strategy for player B is 
*
4b
a cx  . 
Hence, at the Stackelberg equilibrium, we have 
* a c a c  , ,
2 4
   x              (16) 
which leads to the profits 
   2 2* , .           (17) 
8 16
a c a c     
f
achieve the Nash equilibrium 
earlier, there is no specific order of obtaining
Note that in order to 
 *ax  and 
*
bx  
equ
ho
in solving the simultaneous Equat
ilibrium can be achieved by free competition is is 
ions (7) and the 
. Th
wever not true for the Stackelberg equilibrium where 
the leader’s strategy, *ax , must be obtained first and the 
follower(s) respond. As the number of players increases, 
the complexity of the Stackelberg game will increase 
considerably and the simplicity of the Nash game will 
prevail. In addition, a game with all leaders degenerates 
to a Nash game. 
In the two-firm example, because Firm A knows pre- 
cisely the strategy adopted by Firm B (13), it is able to 
achieve a higher profit than what is achieved by the Nash 
equilibrium. However, the key questions are:   
 If (13) is not known by Firm A, or Firm A only 
knows partial information about (13), e.g., d db ax x  
or only * *d db ax x , would it still help Firm A to obtain 
a better or even Stackelberg strategy? If the answer is 
yes, this would mean that the level of cognition for a 
leader could be significantly reduced.  
 Also, what if two players have partial information 
about each other’s strategies? What will happen?  
This has motivated us to investigate the Nash game 
with simultaneous forward-looking players, in which 
each player optimizes its strategy based on its own belief. 
3.
the resulting equilibrium of a game. At the same time, we 
 Forward-Looking Competition 
After the discussion of Nash and Stackelberg equilibria 
above, it is clear that players’ cognition is key to defining 
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understand the beauty of the Nash game where players 
can compete freely (without following a specific order) 
to reach the equilibrium. Based on these two points, we 
present the Nash game with forward-looking players. 
To facilitate our analysis, we find it useful to have the 
following definitions. 
 Environmental function—In a competition process, 
the reward for player k  depends not only its own 
strategy kx  but also others’ strategies kx , at any 
given time instant t . We use the environmental  tfunction k kr x  to quantify the influence of other 
players’ strategies (at time instant t ) onto player t ’s 
reward. Obviously, other players’ strategies can 
always be treated as some form of response to a given 
player’s strategy at time instant t .  
 Belief function—A player’s understanding on its 
environmental function reflects its cognition about the 
competition in the game. We assume that player k  
possesses the knowledge of a belief function, which is  B t tdenoted as ,k k kr x x , where kx  denotes the 
strategies from all the players at time instant t  
except player k , and clearly    ,B t t tk k k k kr x r x x . 
The latter relationship further suggests to formulate 
the belief response using some form of Taylor series 
expansion. For example, we may write 
   ,B t tk k k k k k k kr x r   x x      (18) 
where 
 
t tx x   ,
d ,
d
B t
k k kt
k
k
r x
x
  x  is regarded as the inter-  
ference derivative (to be discussed in Sectio
belief function  is player s cognition on what 
ironme ctio
 
n 3.3). The  Bkr 
ntal fun
k ’
the env n  kr   would be, given a 
strategy kx  and the present state 
t
kx . If    Bk kr r   , 
then player k ’s cognition will be perfect. Otherwise, it 
is only a predictio .
 Predicted reward—The pred ted reward function, 
denoted by   , ,B tk k k kf x r x x , indicates the 
amount of reward player k  believes to achieve by 
the strategy k
n   
ic
k
x  and other players’ strategies at time 
tinstant t , kx , based on the belief function  Bkr  . 
3.1. A Motivating Example 
In Section 2.3, if player A is a Stackelberg leader, then it 
has the environmental function (or response) a br x  
 (13). and knows perfectly the strategy of player B
f function Therefore, it has the perfect belie
   0.5 .Ba a a b ar x r x a x c            (19) 
If player A’s cognition is reduced; for instance, knows 
at any given time instant 
d d
0.5
t
b b
t
x x
dd aa xx
    in (13) and  
can observe the environmental function at present time 
t , i.e.,    ,B t t t ta a b a b br x x r x x  , player A can formulate 
its belief function, using a fi series, as rst-order Taylor 
   , 0.5B t t ta a b b a ar x x x x x           (20) 
reward functionand its predicted  can be expressed as 
    , ,B t Ba a a a b a a a
 0.5 0.5 .t tb a a a
f x r x x a x r c x   
a x x c x x    
     (21) 
From the side of player B, if it has as low cognition as 
a Nash player, then it will have the belief function 
B t
b ar x . Hence, player B’s reward function will be 
    
  .
b b b b a b b b
t
a b b
, ,B t Bf x r x x a r x c x   
a x c x x   
      (22) 
As a result, player A’s strategy can be optimized by 
  
 
0
, ,max
0.5 0.5 .max
a
B t
a a a a b
x
t t
f x r x x
a x x c x x

    
 
0a
b a a a
x 
     (23) 
By setting 
d
0
d
B
a
a
f
x
 , this suggests an updating process 
1 0.5 .t t ta b ax a x x c
                (24) 
r hand, foOn the othe r player B, it aims to solve 
    
0 0
, ,max max
b b
B t t
b b b b a a b b
x x
.f x r x x a x c x x
 
      (25) 
By setting 
d
0
d
bf
x
B
b
 , player B updates its strategy by 
1 .t tb ax a x c
                    
- 
pe  w
(26) 
Applying the two updating rules (24) and (26) re
atedly, as t e get  ,
* , ,              (27) 2 4
a c a c    x
16), bu mpletely different process. 
The striking result here is that t
librium can now be achieved by a 
 the Nash equilibrium with forward-looking 
which ends up the same strategy in the Stackelberg 
equilibrium ( t via a co
he Stackelberg equi- 
free competition be- 
tween the players without following a specific order of 
how the game should be played and that the so-called 
leader, i.e., player A here, does not need perfect cog- 
nition of the environmental function (13), but a good 
belief (20). 
3.2. Definition of the New Equilibrium 
Motivated by the potential of being forward-looking, we 
here present
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players (i.e., with some cognition in the form of belief 
functions). Mathematically, it is written as 
    
where  is the belief function reflecting player 
y and 
 * * * *
  and  :
, , , , ,
k k
B B
k k k k k k k k k
k x S
f x r x f x r x
 
x x    (28) k
 Bkr 
’s cognition abilitk  kf   
. Note that (28) 
is the predicted
nctio er can be rewritten as 
as such, at the equilibrium
.x   
ion  can be 
chosen arbitrarily and it only serves to i e
’s understanding about the comp o
3
In the proposed model of the Nash game with forward- 
ose its own 
belief function. Altogether, the combination of the play- 
where 
 reward 
fu n for play k
    * *  and  : , ,Bk k k k k k k kk x S f f x r x   x x   (29) 
because according to (18),    * * *,Bk k k k kr x r x x  and 
, we have 
       * * * * * *, , ,B k k kf x r x f x r fk k k k k k k  x x (30) 
In this model, the belief funct  Bkr 
ndicat
etition envir
sh equ
 player 
nment. k
In fact, (29) embraces the conventional Na ilibrium 
(4) in which players have the belief function    ,B t tk k k kr x r x x  which effectively treats the en- 
vironment player k  observes at any present time instant 
t  as fixed and constant and ignores the subsequent 
chan ers’ strategies provoked by player 
k ’s new strategy. 
We refer to the equilibrium of a Nash game with belief 
functions as a belief-directed Nash equilibrium (BNE). 
.3
k
ges in other play
. From Interference Derivative to  
Pareto-Optimality 
looking players, every player is free to cho
ers’ belief functions defines the resulting equilibrium of 
the players’ competition and has numerous possibilities. 
To examine this, we consider in the two-firm example 
that 
   
   
, ,
, ,
B t t t
a a b b a a a
B t t t
r x x x x x
r x x x x x


                (31) b b a a b b b
 ,a b λ
vatives which can 
 are regarded as th
deri be interpreted as th
of the environmental function with respect to one’s 
. Also, (31) 
(32) 
For convenience, we refer to this two-firm example as 
a BNE game by BNE(λ). In this game, player A aims to 
e interference 
e rate of change 
strategy can be viewed as a first-order Taylor 
series approximation for the response. With (31), we can 
express the predicted reward functions for the players as 
     
     
, , ,
, , .
B t t t
a a a a b b a a a a a
B t t t
b b b b a a b b b b b
f x r x x a x c x x x x
f x r x x a x c x x x x


            
 
  
  
0
,max
a
t t
b a a a a a
x
a x c x x x x

     
0
, ,max
a
B t
a a a a b
x
f x r x x

     
which can be solved by setting 
(33) 
d
0
d
B
a
a
f
x
 . This then gives 
 1 .2 1
t t
t b a a
a
a
a x x c
x


                (34) 
erive th
result for optimizing 
Similarly, we can easily d e corresponding 
bx . As (after a sufficient 
number of iterations), at , we have 
 t   
e equilibriumth
  
  
  
  
* 1 ,
1
b
a
a c
x
a


  
*
2 2 1
.
2 2 1
a b
a
b
a b
c
x
 
 
        
          (35) 
The above strategies will lead to the profits (or re- 
wards) 
    
  
     
2
  
2
*
2
2
1 1
,
2 2 1
.
2 2 1
a b
a
a b
b
a b
a c
f
f
 
 
 
        
22
* 1 1a ba c  
 

   
     
Very interestingly, we can observe that the equilibrium 
varies according to the belief parameters of 
, which offers an opportunity to optimize the equi- 
librium. 
In order to illustrate this, we let 
      (36) 
the players, 
λ
a b     and 
consider that   is an optimization parameter of the 
game. Then   can be optimized by 
   
   
2 1a c 
23 3  .max
 

The above op imization maximizes both the sum-profit 
and the indiv ual profits of the playe
             (37) 
t
id rs, and therefore is 
Pareto-optimal. Note that 3  
ed soluti
 is not permitted as 
this would lead to unbound ons to *ax  and 
*
bx . 
It can be easily shown that optimal of  the  value   is 
1 , which gives 
*
1
, ,
4 4
a c a c

     x             (38) 
and 
   2 2
1
, .
8 8
a c a c

      
         (39) *f
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We summarize our results and inc
ing scenarios in Table 1. Note tha
ple, the Stackelberg equilibrium is not Pareto- 
al. It can be seen by comparing it with BNE(1) that 
if the leader is being less aggressive, 
reduced but the profit for the follower
increased. 
lude some interest- 
t in this two-firm 
exam
optim
its profit is not 
 can be further 
Another observation is that achieving Pareto-optimum 
does not require that the players’ cognition be accurate. 
In particular, for the case of Pareto-optimum, i.e., 1  , 
we see from (34) that at the equilibrium, we have 
* *d d
3.a b
r x                 (40) * *d dx xa a
However, intriguingly, the player’s cognition is very 
different and for player A, we have 
d Br
1 3.
d
a
ax
                 (41) 
This reveals that the belief function a player has is not 
re
has changed our understanding on how player’s cog- 
nition influences the equilibrium of
world may be an outcome from peop
On the contrary, if 
quired to reflect the true reality but can still achieve the 
best outcome from the competition of the players. This 
 a game. A beautiful 
le’s mistakes. 
1   , then it can be shown that 
 
Table 1. Strategies and profits for various equilibria. 
Model Strategy  *x  Profit/Reward  *f
Nash Equilibrium 
 BNE λ  with 
 0,0λ  
2 ,
3
c    3
a c a
 
 BNE λ  with 
 †  3,3λ ,6 6
a c a  c     
   2 23 ,
9 9

a c a c  
Stackelberg  
Equilibriu

m 
 BNE λ  with 
 0.5 λ ,0   
,
2 4
a c a c      
   2 2,
8 16
a c a c     
 BNE λ  with 
 1,1λ #  ,4 4
a c a c      
   2 2,
8 8
a c a c     
 
 BNE λ  with 
 1, λ 1  ,2 2
a c a c       0,0  
†It has the same pr its as Nash equilibrium but half production. ◊It achieves 
the Stackelberg equilibrium but is not Pareto-optimal. #This is the 
Pareto-optimal equilibrium. 
of
*
ar
*
* *
d d d d
1  and  1,
d dd d
B B
a b
a ba b
r r r
x xx x
b           (4 ) 
and the b unctions are perfect in terms of repre- 
senting the reality. Unfortunately, the profits r both 
players at the equilibrium will be , showing that if 
le, we also included the case with 
2
elief f
fo
 0
both players are perfectly smart, the outcome could be a 
tragedy. 
In this tab 3   
w the 
which interestingly results in the same profits a
equilibrium but with half production. To show ho
s the Nash 
belief (or the interference derivative  ) affects the 
strategy * * *a bx x x   and the reward * * *a bf f f  , we 
provide the results in Figure 1 assumi g that 10a cn   . 
3.4. Existence 
Since the birth of game theory, the quest for the existence 
of an equilibrium has been the focal point in this area. In 
[6], Nash proved the existence of the widely known Nash 
equilibrium we know today. Later, numer us researchers 
presented further theorems and proofs about xist- 
ence of the game-theoretic equilibria [7,8]. n 
o
 the e
 Based o
 the literature, we provide the sufficient 
existence of the general BNE game. 
what is known in
condition for the 
Corollary 1 Consider a K -player game, with the 
strategy spaces k  for 1, 2, ,k K  , which are not 
empty, compact and convex subsets of an Euclidean 
space. If the predicted reward function    , ,B tk k k k kf x r x k x  is continuous and quasi-concave 
in kS  for any fixed 
t
kx , then there exists an equi- 
librium.  
 
 
Figure 1. The strategy and reward at various equilibria 
against the belief  assuming . The solid line 
refers to the resul s for the str e the dash line 
shows the rewards. 
λ
t
10a c 
ategy whil
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Proof The BNE game (with forward-looking players) 
presented in Section 3.2 follows the same spirit as a 
typical Nash game where any player acts towards an 
equilibrium assuming that other players’ strategies are 
fixed. Their only difference lies in their understanding 
about the payoff functions due to different level of cog- 
nition to the environment. Consequently, the same result 
regarding existence of Nash equilibrium [7] can be di- 
rectly applied to BNE by simply replacing the pay off 
function by the predicted reward function, which com- 
pletes the proof. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper showed the importance of players’ cogn
to the equilibrium of the game and presented the 
equilibrium of forward-looking players. Using a two-fi
example, we demonstrated how a Nash game with belief 
(referred to as BNE) can be made to achieve the Nas
ition 
Nash 
rm 
h 
and Stackelberg equilibria. On the other hand, this paper 
has also illustrated the potential of using the belief func- 
tion as an optimization parameter which makes possible 
the game converging to a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. 
However, this is a new regime in game theory and future 
work is required to better understanding of belief-di- 
rected games. 
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